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Desponsamus te, mare, in signum veri perpetuique domini. “We wed you, O Sea, as a symbol 
of our absolute and everlasting supremacy.” This ceremonial proclamation, delivered by the 
doge of Venice on Ascension Day as he threw a wedding ring into the sea from the top deck 
of the state barge,1 reflected both the spirit of the city of Venice and the very essence of its 
long-lasting socioeconomic well being. The unique geographical setting of the city implied, but 
did not preordain the maritime supremacy of the Serenissima. Venice owed a great deal of her 
commercial success to the efficiency of her authority and administrative mechanism. And it 
is the immensity of the state bureaucracy that makes the study of Venetian maritime history 
such a time consuming, though rewarding task. Only a relatively small part of the state papers 
are published,2 leaving interested scholars with the seldom-lamented necessity to visit the City 
on the Lagoon. Perhaps the richness of Venetian archives coupled with the attraction of the 
city itself explains why scholars rarely use Venetian documents from collections outside of the 
1 Alvise Zorsi, Venice 697-1797: A City, a Republic, an Empire (1983; revised ed., New York, 2001), 28.
2 See R. Cessi & P. Sambin, ed., Le Deliberazione del Consiglio dei Rogat (Senato) serie Mixtorum (Venice, 1960); 
George Martin Thomas, ed., Diplomatarium Veneto-Levantinum, sive Ata et Diplomata Res Venetas, Graecas atque 
Levantis Illustrantia (New York, 1966); R. Morozzo della Rocca and A. Lombardo, ed., Documenti del Commercio Ve-
neziano nei secoli XI-XIII (Turin, 1940); V. I. Lamanskii, ed., Secrets d’Etat de Venise:Documents, Extraits, Notices, et 
Etudes Servant a Eclarir les Rapport de la Fin du Xve et au XVIe Siecle (New York, 1968).
40 E. Anichenko, Pro Honore et Commercio Nostris
city.3 In some instances, however, those documents kept abroad have escaped the fate of the 
collections lost to fires and other misfortunes, and valuable evidence has been preserved.
Such is the case of the manuscript Lat Q.V. II N12 from the collection of the Russian National 
Library, Saint Petersburg. Entitled Barbadigo Agostino, Dux Venetiarum/Instructiones Datae 
AngeloGradenigo, this manuscript of Venetian provenance contains several documents related 
to commercial voyages to Beirut and dates from the year 1499. As an important center of the 
trade in spice and other lucrative oriental commodities, Beirut always held a special place 
in Venetian commerce. For almost two hundred years, during which the city was one of the 
strongholds of the Crusaders’ Kingdom of Jerusalem, the Europeans, and Venetians especially, 
obtained first hand knowledge of the commercial benefits the city had to offer. The capture 
of the city by the Mamluks in 1291 was a dreadful blow to the European commercial opera-
tions in the region. With time commerce, in which Venice was to play a leading role, revived, 
but became extremely susceptible to any perturbation of the complex relationship between 
the Christian and Muslim worlds. When in 1306 Venice entered into a league with Charles of 
Valois for the restoration of the Latin empire, all galley voyages eastward became subject to 
extensive governmental controls.4 Specific details about the routes, crews, and freight rates of 
these voyages up to the year 1569 were recorded in the papers of the Senate, and now can be 
found in the Archivio di Stato di Venezia.5 Interestingly, the records for the years 1499-1519, 
the period of the escalation of the military conflict between Venice and the Sublime Porte, are 
missing.6 This manuscript, therefore, fills some gaps in our knowledge regarding Venetian 
maritime operations at the time.
The Levantine fleet, which almost exclusively consisted of great galleys, was of crucial signifi-
cance for these turbulent years of Venetian history. From their invention at the end of the thir-
teenth century, great galleys were subjects of special pride, the symbol of Venetian maritime 
power. With an average capacity of about 250 tons and the propelling power of both oarsmen 
and sails, great galleys were swift and well manned, which made them equally important as 
vessels of commerce and war. In peaceful times they carried the most precious trade com-
modities, such as spice. During naval battles they were placed at the front line of the formation, 
and entrusted with the crucial task of disrupting the enemy battle line.7 As some of the largest 
vessels of the time, great galleys were expensive both to build and to man. It is therefore not 
surprising that despite of the importance of this vessel type, the number of Venetian great 
galleys never exceeded twenty. Because of their speed and reliability, this modest number of 
galleys, however, contributed more than a third of the state’s annual income. Naturally, the 
safety of the ships soon became a matter of great significance to the state.
Starting from the first decade of the fourteenth century, the republic’s government gradually 
increased its control over commercial voyages of special economic importance. The first at-
tempts to regulate private navigation on the most important trade routes were initiated by the 
desire to organize such voyages in protected convoys. The costs of such convoys, however, 
3 Publication of Paul Kristeller’s Iter Italicum: a Finding List of Uncatalogued or Incompletely Catalogued Humanistic 
Manuscripts of the Renaissance in Italy and Other Libraries (Leiden, 1990) is an important step in directing research-
ers’ attention towards the Italian manuscripts preserved in manuscript depositories throughout Europe. 
4 Frederick C. Lane, “Operation of Merchant Galleys”, Venice and History (Baltimore, 1966), 203.
5 For the years before 1440 these documents are in series Senato Misti, for 1440-1469 in Senato Mar, and after 1469 
in a special series called “Senato, Deliberazioni, Incanti Galere”, which continues up to 1569. See Frederic C. Lane, 
Venetian Ships and Shipbuilders of the Renaissance (Baltimore, 1934), 15.
6 Ibid., 14-15.
7 Ibid., 150.
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were too high even for the government. At the same time very few, if any, of the Venetian 
merchants could afford to own a great galley. In an attempt to achieve an efficient balance of 
investment, and to ensure the state’s firm grasp on this important naval asset, a new system 
called incanti was invented. According to this new mode of operation, the great galleys were 
communally built and owned. Every year the government auctioned a certain number of the 
galleys for the voyage to Beirut, Alexandria, the Black Sea, Barbary, or Flanders. After being 
authorized by the Senate or the Maggior Consiglio, the highest bidders became official masters 
of the ships, called patroni.8 Bound by specific conditions decided by the Venetian Senate, 
these patrons were then responsible for all expenses associated with preparation for the voy-
ages. Initially, the patroni paid the lease after they returned to Venice, but starting from 1438 a 
deposit of 100 to 400 ducats was required.9 In return, the government often offered the patrons 
a loan for the manning of the ships. Patrons profited both from shipping their own goods 
and from leasing cargo space to other merchants. As long as the voyage was profitable, this 
system was advantageous for both private and state sectors of the Venetian economy. It eased 
the burden of the initial expenses for the merchants and yielded a stable income to the state, 
while delivering it from many tedious technicalities of manning and provisioning the ships. In 
addition, the communal ownership of the galleys was supposed to enable Venice to conduct 
swift and efficient mobilization of the war fleet, should the escalation of international conflict 
require it.10 The founding act of this state-controlled regulation, Ordo galearum armatarum 
of 1321, decreed that the government could exercise the right of requisition at any time.11 It 
did not, however, mean that under such circumstances the conditions of the galley’s lease had 
to be terminated. For one thing war, as well as commerce was viewed as a potential source 
of income;12 for another, all Venetian noblemen were conventionally expected to prove their 
patriotism by direct physical and financial participation in matters of state defense. 
The system of incanti was indeed a remarkably elegant solution, conceived with all the gusto 
of Venetian ambitions. According to an observant remark of Frederic Lane:
Communal ownership of galleys expressed the solidarity of the Venetian nobility and 
strengthened that solidarity. The system of annual auctions, combining advantages of private 
operation with communal control and ownership, was a vital element in giving to the Venetian 
government the efficiency and stability which distinguished it from so many other Italian city-
states of the fourteenth century.13
Yet, by the second decade of the sixteenth century the system failed. Our manuscript, therefore, 
provides an opportunity to take a close look at this specific form of fleet organization in its 
waning years. It is especially interesting, because it covers years of both peaceful trade and 
military conflict. 
The manuscript is written on parchment in accordance with the Venetian tradition of not 
trusting important state documents to the lower endurance of paper, which was significantly 
cheaper and widely available by that time. The codex contains two related documents: 1) the 
8 Margarett M. Newett, Canon Pietro Casola’s Piligrimage to Jerusalem in the year 1494, (Manchester, 1907), 59.
9 G. Luzzatto. I Prestiti della Repubblica diVnezia, Secoli XIII-XV. (Padova, 1929), 19. 
10 Susan Rose, Medieval Naval Warfare 1000-1500 (London and new York, 2002), 114.
11 Bernard Doumerc, “An Examplary Maritime Republic: Venice at the End of the Middle Ages,” War at sea in the 
Middle Ages and the Renaissance. (N.Y., 2003),156.
12 Frederic C. Lane, “National Wealth and protection Costs,” Venice and History, 376. 
13 Lane, “Operation of Merchant Galleys,” Ibid., 226. 
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instructions given by the Doge Agostino Barbarigo (Barbadigo in the manuscript) to Angelo 
Gradenigo, appointed the captain of the four-galley fleet, bound for Beirut on May 8, 1492,14 
and 2) the deliberations of the Venetian Senate regarding the preparation and auction of four 
Beirut galleys dated May 19, 1499. The documents are written by different hands. The first 
folio of the second document is the last folio of the fifth quire, which reveals that the codex 
preserves its original composition as opposed to convoluted compendium.15 It is possible, 
however, that the second document was written on the blank pages of the codex later then the 
first one, perhaps according to their dates. Most of the text is written in Latin with the peculiar 
inclusion of certain Italianisms such as viagio. Starting with the folio 32 verso the Venetian 
dialect of Italian almost entirely replaces Latin in the text.
The Russian collector Peter Dubrowskii acquired the codex at the end of the eighteenth 
century, perhaps in Paris where he served at the Russian consulate. Dubrowskii’s collection 
became the core of the manuscript department of the Russian Imperial Library, later the Rus-
sian National Library. The only information about the manuscript’s previous history is that it 
originally belonged to the Gradenigo family, whose court of arms is depicted on the bottom of 
the manuscript’s title page. 16
Few families in Venice occupied a position so prominent and honorable as the old clan of 
Gradenigo. They make their first appearance on the pages of the Venetian chronicles in 976, 
when a certain Giovanni Gradenigo rescued the body of the unfortunate Doge Pietro Candiano 
IV, sent by rebels to the slaughterhouse, for a more appropriate burial.17 Since then the mem-
bers of the family had many opportunities to serve the Republic in less dolorous ways, provid-
ing the Serenissima with three doges, several generals, and numerous merchants and sailors. 
If there was a name of equal glory in Venice, it was that of the Barbarigo family. The succes-
sion of Agostino Barbarigo to the Doge’s seat in 1486 immediately following his brother Marco, 
an “unheard-of occurrence,”18 demonstrates how powerful the family’s position was in the city. 
The personal popularity of Doge Agostino Barbarigo (1486-1501), however, failed to match the 
high standards of his family reputation. The Senator Domenico Malipiero’s remark that he was 
“a man who in a short time had gained much experience in the government of this country; 
but was very obstinate in holding to his own opinion”19 was by far the most complimentary 
expression of the feelings his fellow citizens had for the doge. Perhaps the most characteris-
tic impression Agostino Barbarigo left of himself was the fact that immediately following his 
death three inquisitors were set to the task of investigating his transgressions and address-
ing charges laid against him.20 The scale of Doge Barbarigo’s corruption was apparently so 
frightening, that from then on such inquisitions became a routine exercised after every doge’s 
death.21 It is hard to tell if the commission received by Angelo Gradenigo was encouraged by 
any financial means, but the study of operation of the Venetian merchant fleets of the time 
14 Barbadigo Agostino, Dux Venetiarum, Instructiones Datae Angelo Gradenigo (Henceforth Instructiones) 2-43 verso.
15 The manuscript consists of six quires of ten folios each, if the codex was convoluted, the second part would start 
on folio 51 recto. 
16 For the detailed codicological and paleographical description see E.V. Bernadskaia, Italianskie gumanisty v sobranii 
rukopisei GPB [Italian humanists in the manuscript collection of the State Public Library] (Leningrad, 1981) 112-114.
17 John J. Norwich, A History of Venice (New York, 1982), 42.
18 Domenico Malipiero, Annali Veneti dall’anno 1457-1500 (Florence, 1843) I, 680.
19 Ibid. Citation is translated in Newett, Canon Pietro Casola’s Piligrimage to Jerusalem, 371.
20 Norwich, A History of Venice, 389.
21 Newett, Canon Pietro Casola’s Piligrimage to Jerusalem, 372.
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suggests that the position offered relatively high social status. The captain-in-chief was the 
main representative of the state during the voyages, entrusted with the uneasy task of balanc-
ing the ever-changing private initiative with the state’s stabilizing control. How this balance 
was achieved, what impact the dual character of the operation had on the crew, merchants, 
and passengers, what were the benefits of this system for private and state commerce - are 
some of the key questions that can be extrapolated from the text of Insructiones Datae Angelo 
Gradenigo. 
The main purpose of the Instructions was to provide the newly appointed captain of the fleet 
with a description of his duties as well as with a concise codex of maritime law, which could 
be taken on board the ship. The date of the Instructions, May 1492, probably corresponds with 
the date of Angelo Gradenigo’s appointment. Apart from the manuscript, the only known men-
tion of Angelo Gradenigo as a captain-in-chief of the Beirut galleys known to me comes from 
the diary of the canon Pietro Casola, which he kept during his pilgrimage to Jerusalem. On 
Tuesday, September 9 1494, Casola wrote:
Very late in the day three galleys were sighted belonging to the Levant Trading Fleet, which 
were on their way from Venice. The captain-in-chief was Don Juliano22 Gradenigo, and they 
were called the Beyrout (sic) galleys. They had a stern wind, which was unfavorable for us. 
They recognized us immediately, and when they came near, the two largest lowered their sails 
in order not to pass us by. At the second hour of the night we were so very near one another, 
that there was general rejoicing on the one side and the other; the cannon were fired, and 
there was much shouting, as is the custom of sailors.
A small boat, or rather, as they say, a campano, was lowered into water from one of the 
Beyrout galleys, and many persons came to visit our captain, and many letters were brought 
to him from Venice. They told us the news of the West, especially about the movements of the 
King of France; and, amongst other things, a Franciscan friar, belonging to the Zorzi family, 
said, that in Venice, on the Vigil of Saint Lawrence, it was said publicly, that the King of France 
was expected at Milan on the 16th of August, and much other news.
They remained on board, and there was a great illumination for nearly an hour, and then, 
having taken leave of the friends, they returned to their galleys, which looked like the daughters 
of ours. We still remained with the wind contrary, and they went flying away with the wind in 
the stern.23
Another source, the diary of Senator Marino Sanuto, indicates that at least starting from No-
vember of 1498 and until his death in January of 1499 Angelo (Anzelo) Gradenigo occupied the 
position of Venetian rector of Modon. 24
As a state employee, appointed by the doge and approved by the Senate, the captain-in-chief 
was not allowed to take any financial interest from the trade. Not only was he prohibited from 
having his own goods on board (with the exception of precious stones) or entering in any finan-
cial agreements, he was even not supposed to be seen in the vicinity of the market places or 
sleep on dry land.25 Such limitations were perhaps imposed to make him a watchful guard of 
22 Casola was a man in his seventies when he undertook the pilgrimage and he composed his diary several years later. 
This might explain why he failed to recall Gradenigo’s first name correctly.
23 Newett, Canon Pietro Casola’s Pilgrimage to Jerusalem, 301-302. 
24 Marino Sanuto, I Diarii (Venice, 1879-1903) II, 372.
25 “Nec potes habere partem in aliqua galea tibi comissa: nec facere mercationes ullo modo: non intellegendo de 
lapidibus et perils. Verum licitum est tibi habere super galeis de tuo: aliis mercatoribus recomendato: nec potes ire 
cum aliqua persona ad videndum mercationes nec dormire in terram.” Instructiones, Capitula III, 1 verso. Note the 
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governmental regulations, not compromised by consideration of his own commercial benefits. 
The penalty for the violation of this law was an astronomical fee of one thousand ducats, a 
sum more eloquent then most verbose admonition. 
The handsome salary of 180 ducats26 was, however, not the only reward for the captain-in-
chief’s service. He also received one third of most of the penalties imposed by him during the 
voyage. The other two thirds went consequently to the accusatory (the person who brought the 
breaking of the law to the attention of the officials) and to the commune. This regulation prob-
ably reflects the medieval tradition of paying a judge’s salary out of the fees or confiscations 
following his hearing of the case. 
Keeping “the justice and good judgment according to the State regulations and his own fear 
and honesty” 27 was indeed one of the main functions of the captain-in-chief. In pursuing this 
mission he was to cooperate with state officials at any Venetian dominion, by turning over to 
them any person from the galleys accused of an offense against local law. If the ships were 
out of the port where the offence was committed, the captain either kept the offender under 
custody until he could turn him over to the Venetian rectors, or applied the punishment in 
accordance with the law of that place.28 It is not clear which source for the local law the cap-
tain was supposed to use. Perhaps some recommendations were included in the instructions 
of the Levantine Office, given to him before departure from Venice.29 Records of all penalties 
and punishments applied by the captain during the voyage were to be submitted to the Ducal 
Chancellery within eight days of the return to Venice.
Most issues on which the captain was instructed to keep his eye were related to the safety of 
the ships and people.30 Experienced mariners, the Venetians knew the dangers of overloading 
and took precautions against it. Hulls of all ships in the service of the Serenissima had loading 
marks in the shape of a cross. The age of the ship was taken into consideration for calculating 
how low the ship was allowed to settle upon loading. For five years from the first day they set 
sail, ships of 200 millarii31 and more might be loaded two and a quarter feet above the cross, 
for the ship five to seven years old - two feet above the cross, more than seven years - one and 
a half feet above the cross.32 It was the direct responsibility of the fleet’s captain-in-chief to 
examine each vessel and call the attention of the consuls of the merchants in Venice, or the 
governors of Venetian possessions elsewhere, to any violations.33 According to chapter seven 
of the Instructiones, however, the captain could demand to move some merchandise from one 
peculiar permission to carry on some profitable operations with the assistance of other merchants. See also S. P. 
Karpov, Putiami Srednevekovuh Morehodov : Chernomorskaia Navigacija Venecianskoi Respubliki v XIII-XIV Vekah. 
[The ways of the Medieval seafarers: Black Sea navigation of the Venetian Republic in the XII-XIV centuries] (Moscow, 
1994) 87.
26 Instructiones, 48 verso. 
27 “Rationem et iustitiam facies inter gentes tibi comissas secundam nostra discretionem bona fide sine fraude” In-
structiones, Capit. VI, 2 verso.
28 Ibid.
29 “Tu capitaneus antequam de Venetiis recedes teneris accipere de officialibus Levantis ordines pertinentes dictis 
galeis:quos ipsi officials dare debent in scriptis.” Instructiones, Capit. XI, 4. 
30 Chapter 14 represents him also as a defender of the good name of the people of Venice: if during the voyage he en-
countered somebody affronting the honor of the country, he was instructed to capture him and “apply a punishment” 
according to his social status. Ibid., 4 verso.
31 1000 Venetian pounds=approximately 477 kilograms. 
32 Newett, Canon Pietro Casola’s Pilgrimage to Jerusalem, 27.
33 Instrutiones, Capit. VIII, 3. 
45Povijesni prilozi 26., 39.-57. (2004)
galley to another in order to even the loading of the ships.34 This measure, hardly popular 
among the individual merchants, was intended to serve common good, for it increased the 
feasibility of the voyage and improved the general seaworthiness of the fleet.
Perhaps the most difficult, but clearly the important task in supervising the loading of the 
four ships, purchased and operated by different merchants, was to enforce the simultaneous 
completion necessary for on-time departure. Muda, the state specified time period within 
which the ships were allowed to load and leave the ports, was an efficient way to plan capital 
turnover and to protect ships sailing through unfriendly territories, but it also limited the 
freedom of commercial enterprise. The merchants often waited until the very last moment, 
hoping for a sudden price reduction or other commercial benefit. Very well aware of the 
profit-oriented character of their fellow - citizens, the Venetian legislators tightened the law 
regarding the violation of muda.
Chapter 60 of the Instructiones warned Gradenigo that any delay of departure from either 
Alexandria or Beirut would cost both the captain and the patron of the ship 500 ducats and 
the loss of all public positions for the five-year period.35
Although the captain-in-chief was not directly involved in hiring the crew, crossbowmen and 
navigators were his responsibilities because of their importance for the safety of the voy-
age.36 Both before and after the invention of firearms, crossbowmen (balestrieri) constituted 
the main armed force of the Venetian galleys.37 They were recruited from the young Venetian 
men without distinction of caste upon the demonstration of their shooting skills. To go as bal-
estrieri aboard a ship was considered a distinguished way of learning the skills of a mariner. 
To encourage the youngsters to advance in this career, targets for practicing were erected in 
various places in the city of Venice.38 
The manuscript has contradictory information regarding the number of balestrieri on board. 
Chapter 63 states that each galley had twenty-six of them,39 while chapter four mentions only 
fifteen, of which three are noblemen. All of them received a salary of six ducats a month, and 
were prohibited to hold any other position except for the position of balestrieri under the 
penalty of 100 ducats. Neither patrons nor their representatives were allowed to participate 
in hiring, although it was they who paid the balestrieris’ salary. This restriction most probably 
resulted from the corruption associated with distribution of these desirable positions.40 
The main burden of hiring, provisioning, and loading the ship was laid on the Patrons. The hir-
ing process was called “ponere bancum,” meaning literally to place a bench or table, because 
of the way the hiring was done. Shipmasters were accustomed to set up tables with money on 
them in front of the ducal palace, and give out advance wage payments to seamen who signed 
on.41 Such a procedure demanded sufficient capital, for the total number of people involved in 
34 “ Et quia frequenter contigit quod galee non onerantur equaliter tam eundo quam redeundo: Reliquimus in libertate 
tua pro adequando dictas galeas de faciendo accipi de una galea et poni in aliam: et super hoc imponendi penam 
sicut tibi videbitur” Ibid., Capit. VII, 3.
35 Instructiones, Capit. LX, 19 verso.
36 Ibid., Capit XVII, 5 verso.
37 Balestrieri were not the only armed men aboard. All sailors and caulkers were required to have weapons and to 
participate in military engagements.
38 Newett, Canon Pietro Casola’s Pilgrimage to Jerusalem, 375. 
39 Instructiones, LXIII, 20.
40 Newett, Canon Pietro Casola’s Pilgrimage to Jerusalem, 375-376.
41 Ibid., p.217.
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the operation of a great galley exceeded two hundred. According to the manuscript, 226 per-
sons should have been on board each Beirut galley, including a galley commander (comitus), 
a lawyer, two scribes, a caulker, eight hands, twenty-six balestrieri, one hundred eighty-one 
oarsmen, a cook, a freight collector, and a carpenter.42 All of them were free citizens of Venice 
or her dominions and were paid monthly by patrons at the fixed state rate. Since it was not 
incredibly rare that sailors signed up but did not appear for departure, upon approaching the 
city of Pola (Pula) the captains of each galley were advised to call all crew on deck and person-
ally check the list of names. Vacant positions could then be filled in Pola.43 After the galleys 
left this Istrian port, the captain-in-chief had to create a sort of auxiliary council on board 
each ship, choosing “the three most trustful merchants among those older than 35.”44 The 
oldest was appointed the head of this “council of three.” This temporary body exercised the 
supervisory functions of the captain-in-chief, who of course, could not be physically present on 
all four galleys. The council also provided vox populi galei with legitimate power, which cor-
responded with the ancient maritime tradition of taking everyone’s opinion into consideration 
when important decisions were to be made.45
Merchants’ participation in the voyages was regulated by their agreements with the Patrons, 
which were to be recorded by the ship scribes and signed in their presence. While there could 
be some minor variations in the conditions of payment and loading, most of the financial terms 
were again set by the State regulations. The patron was not supposed to charge more than 
fifty ducats per voyage per person, with the exception of state employees on business trips, 
who were to be delivered to the place of their destination free of charge.46 The merchants were 
allowed to take on board only a few items of personal belongings: one chest, one mattress, 
and one night vase. For any servant or member of their family the voyage cost twenty-five 
ducats.47 The personal weapons of all merchants were stored together. The cost of food was 
four grosses a day for an individual or two grosses for a member of a family.48 Freight rates for 
most of the goods were also established. 
With few exceptions49 there were no state recommendations regarding what merchandise 
to buy or sell. There were, however, plenty of regulations regarding what and who were not 
welcome on board the Beirut galleys. The basic rule of the thumb was that goods that did not 
belong to Venetian citizens were not allowed on board, unless they were intended to be sold 
in Venice.50 To check international competition, the presence of foreigners on board the Beirut 
galleys was restricted only to those who were approved by the Venetian officials and paid one 
hundred ducats in addition to all other usual fees and expenses.51 Any “assistance” to the 
42 Instructiones., Capit. LXIII, 20.
43 Ibid., Capit.XI, 3 verso 
44 Ibid., Capit. XI, 3 verso. 
45 See M.A. Ashburner, Rhodian Sea Law (Oxford, 1909) cxli.
46 Ibid., Capit. XXXV, 9 verso.
47 Ibid., Capit. XIII, 4. 
48 Ibid., Capit. V, 2.
49Such as encouragement to buy honey in Corona and Montona “without any limitations”. Instructiones, Capit. XXXXV, 
18 verso.
50 Ibid., Capit. XXXIII, 9.
51 This probably refers to those foreigners who wished to go on pilgrimage to the Holy Land. Although Venice had 
specially chartered pilgrim galleys, some pilgrims made their voyage on board merchant galleys bound to Beirut or 
Alexandria. 
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foreign trade in the Levant, especially that of Flanders, was prohibited under the penalty of 
losing all positions and offices for two years.52 Slaves were the only good explicitly prohibited 
on board.53 Despite the fact that transportation of slaves on merchant galleys was banned in 
the middle of the fifteenth century,54 rich slave markets on the Rhodean Islands and in Beirut 
itself proved to be a strong temptation. Chapter 50 of the manuscript delivers a complaint from 
the Knights of Rhodes that Beirut galleys frequently captured and carried away slaves and ser-
vants of both genders, a violation that the captain-in-chief was instructed to check as soon as 
it was discovered. The culprit was then to pay fifty ducats penalty, while the slave was set free 
and dispatched from the ship “in the place considered most appropriate by the Captain.”55
The Instructiones bear only fragmentary information regarding the route of the voyage. Hav-
ing been sailing the same way for several hundred years, the Venetians probably saw little 
sense in describing it in detail. The fleet often sailed within the sight of land to refer to the 
land-marks for their orientation. It is peculiar that on the return trip the fleet was not allowed 
to spend nights on the open sea, either sailing or laying at anchor after Ragusa (Dubrovnik), 
which was likely considered the frontier of the Republic. 56 A special mention is made re-
garding the necessity to stop at Corfu “for the convenience of our beloved citizens.”57 The 
recommendations regarding conduct and behavior while in port did not distinguish between 
Christian and Muslim lands. The captain was to make sure that people descended on land 
unarmed “for the sake of any scandal’s prevention.”58 Equally in Venetian, foreign, and Muslim 
ports all taxes had to be paid in a prompt and timely manner. Port tax was one of very few 
expenses paid by the Venetian state, for which purposes the captains of every galley were 
provided with one hundred ducats.59 
Even from this cursory outlook at the organization of the so-called private operation of the 
communally owned vessels it is apparent that despite the name, the state played by far a more 
distinct role in the voyage operation than the individual merchants. Moreover, the patron of the 
ship emerges as a very marginal figure burdened with obligations, almost without any rights 
or means to have any impact on the proceeding of this commercial enterprise. With all wages, 
fees, freights, and prices being fixed, and routes, stops, periods of buying and selling, loading 
and unloading being established, his ability to carry on a profitable operations by using the 
convenience of time and changing conditions of the market was extremely limited. So was his 
freedom. According to the Instructiones, in Beirut he was not allowed to leave his galley for 
a long time or spend nights on land,60 and only a severe health problem would excuse him 
from returning with the galley to Venice.61 In addition, the state could cancel the voyage any 
time the international situation or its own interests demanded it. Yet, with all that said the 
enterprise should still have been a profitable one. For one thing it was the only way to carry 
52 Ibid., Capit.XXXX, 11verso.
53 Ibid., Capit. L-LI, 15.
54 Senato Misti, reg.49, f 114. See Lane, Venice and History, 7.
55 Instructiones, Capit.L, 15.
56 Ibid., Capit. LI, 15 verso. The fact that after passing Ragusa on the way to Beirut, the captain had to read aloud 
several important regulations to all “people of the galleys” supports this impression.
57 Ibid., Capit. XXXXII, 12.
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on trade with the East after the second half of the fourteenth century. Then the same state 
imposed routine, which might interfere with the innovative commercial approaches, offered 
certain guarantees of market stability. And finally being the patron of the communally owned 
ship was above all an honorable and visible social position. 
The people who benefited most from this form of commercial organization were the most 
probably the merchants. They had much less obligation and fewer concerns than either pa-
trons or the captain-in-chief. At the same time, state participation gave them a sense of protec-
tion, while the presence of the patron’s goods on board the same vessel insured better care 
for the other merchandise. 
Instructiones datae Angelo Gradenigo is obviously a compiled document. Probably very few 
if any, of the chapters were specifically written for the codex. Rather, they were selected from 
various sources of maritime law, which were in use in Venice during this period. The republic 
witnessed several attempts of codification of her various legal practices, none of which was 
ever officially abandoned. The first Venetian maritime statutes were issued under the Doge 
Pietro Ziani in 1227.62 The code was almost exclusively devoted to the issue of the ballast 
and cargo disposition. It also contained the first description of the above-mentioned system 
of overloading control with use of the mark on the ship’s exterior. Only a few years later the 
more comprehensive measures of the Doge Jacopo Tiepolo added several statutes regarding 
the roles and obligations of different participants of the voyage. In 1255, the maritime statutes 
of the Doge Rainiero Zeno repeated what had been enacted by his predecessors but in fuller 
details with some new provisions. For many years his statutes remained the main official 
maritime legislation. The code, however, did not always meet the needs of the growing and 
changing maritime power of Venice. Starting at the beginning of the fourteenth century, the 
Senate and Maggior Consiglio made all necessary modifications to the maritime law. Doubt-
less, they were the product of Venetian legislative thought, but as attempts to accommodate 
existent maritime practices, they often carried the legacy of older legislation, such as Rhodian 
Sea-Law and the Law of the Consulate of the Sea. Only a few chapters of the Insructiones 
have references to their sources, all of which are deliberations of the Senate and Maggior 
Consiglio passed between 1457 and 1475.63 The sources of others, although not as easy to 
identify without access to unpublished collections of Venetian maritime law, probably belong 
to the same group.
The second document in the manuscript is also a product of the Senate. It contains the 
deliberations regarding the preparation and auction of four galleys bound to Beirut, dated 
May 19,1499. The relatively short period between the dates of composition of the first and 
second documents saw radical turnover in Venetian politics. In 1495 Venice entered the Holy 
League against the Grande Turko. By the beginning of this year spies of the Serenissima in 
Constantinople warned the Republic that the sultan’s arsenal was actively involved in building 
a great armada. The purpose of this fleet was unclear. The Porte carried out military actions 
on several fronts, and potential targets could be the Black Sea, the Island of Rhodes, or the 
Venetian colonies in the Aegean Sea.64 The Republic, alarmed by these preparations, initiated 
the organization of its own naval assets. By April 1499 Venice began clearing the sea, detaining 
ships in the lagoon and Adriatic colonies.65 Later the same month a captain general of the sea, 
one Antonio Grimani, was appointed to coordinate the efforts. 
62 See Lane, Venice and History, 227-253; Newett, Canon Pietro Casola’s Pilgrimage to Jerusalem, 23-24.
63 See Instructiones, Capit. LVIIII, 19; Capit. LXXXX, 33; Capit. C, 34v.; Capit. CI, 35).
64 Frederic C. Lane, “Naval actions and fleet organization, 1499-1502,” Renaissance Venice (Totowa, N.J.,1973), 148.
65 Sanuto, I Diarii, I, 780. 
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Despite these actions, war did not seem to be imminent, thus the government faced a dilemma 
as to whether the Levantine galleys, traditionally auctioned in May, should be offered this year. 
Reassured of “Signor Turco’s” peaceful intentions, and perhaps urged on by the desire to make 
up for the naval expenses, the Senate decided to proceed with the auctions.66 Bearing in mind 
the importance of the great galleys as warships, one can naturally expect that the instructions 
given to the Levantine merchant fleet on the verge of potential outbreak of hostility should be 
a promising source of information regarding the transition from the commercial to the naval 
mode of operation. 
The document opens with the list of ships. Two of them, La Contarina and La Capitania, were 
constructed in Aigues Mort. La Marina originated from Alexandria, and La Galia Capitanea 
was built in Beirut.67 All ships were relatively old: the youngest had challenged the sea for 
eleven years, while the oldest had been in service for almost two decades. The age of the ships, 
and the fact that all of them were built abroad are not the only surprising elements of these 
deliberations. Perhaps the most unexpected feature of the document is that there is nothing 
unusual in it. After the specific conditions of the loan (besides the initial payment, one hundred 
ducats were to be paid upon the beginning of loading the ship in Venice, six hundred after the 
ships’ return from Beirut, and two hundred from each patron at any time they can pay),68 the 
deliberations essentially repeat in condensed form the recommendations given in the Instruc-
tiones. It is concerned with the commercial rights and privileges of different crew members,69 
loading and unloading,70 limitations of the personal belongingsof the sailors, 71 regulation of 
the captain’s relationship with the patrons,72 free transportation of Venetian officials, preven-
tion of illegal trade, and other considerations of exclusively commercial character. No essential 
alterations were made in the itinerary of the ships because of the contingency of war: they 
should follow the same route followed by Beirut galleys since 1481. There is also no sign of any 
extra attention towards the armament of the galleys. 
In the eleven folios of the deliberations, published only two months before the fatal engage-
ment with the Sublime Porte at Sapienza, there is not the slightest allusion to the potential 
change in the mode of galleys’ operation. Signing this document on May 19, 1499,73 four pa-
trons entered into commercial agreement according to which the invested capital should be 
directed into trade. Perhaps in hopes that the Turkish threat would keep the competition away 
from the eastern spice markets, the patrons paid a deposit that was almost twice as much as 
the lease of Beirut galleys in the previous year. Any anticipation of commercial gain, however, 
faded by the first days of June. By that time the first Venetian squadron left for Morea, and the 
captain general of the sea demanded all of the great galleys for his fleet. 
Despite the official right of the commune to withdraw the galleys from the commercial opera-
tions for the defense of the Republic, neither patrons nor Arsenal officials rushed to obey the 
order. The first did not want to lose their investments; the latter were justly concerned with the 
66 It is worth mentioning at this point that our manuscript disagrees with the main source for Venetian history of the 
period, the diaries of Marino Sanuto, both regarding the date of the auction and the names of patrons.
67 Ibid, 49.
68 Ibid., 49.
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safety of the ships.74 The patrons’ reluctance to admit the legitimacy of the governmental de-
mand does not seem to be so unusual given that most of them had recently signed the agree-
ment which contained no mention of this possibility. The Ordo galearum armatarum was a 
document of the previous century, with which the Venetian merchants were not likely familiar. 
Thus most patrons, feeling cheated, expressed their dissatisfaction first by demanding great 
compensation and then by slowing down the hiring process (the patrons of the Beirut galleys, 
for example, signed people up, but refused to make the traditional advance payment)75, and 
then by open disobedience. When on June 17 an official representative of savii agli ordini,76 
Andrea Zantani, requisitioned eleven merchant galleys originally intended for the voyages to 
Beirut, Alexandria and Flanders, the merchants revolted.77 To pacify the investors, the doge 
himself made a public address confirming the necessity of such action in view of current in-
ternational affairs.78 It did not, however, have the desired effect. Trying to sooth the anger of 
the patrons, most of whom belonged to prominent Venetian families, the Senate appointed two 
inspectors to supervise the activity of savii. This maneuver escalated the conflict even further, 
moving it into the heart of the Senate, where two different offices started to accuse each other 
of abuse of their authority. The crews demanded a 30 percent raise and were hard to find even 
at this fabulous rate.79 Overcoming these and other difficulties, Venetians, however, succeeded 
in putting together “the most formidable armada which had ever up to that time been collected 
under the flag of St. Mark’s winged lion.”80 Yet the opposing Turkish fleet was even bigger. 
Although Grimani was outnumbered in both men and ship, he believed in the victorious out-
come of the engagement, placing his hope on the performance of his great galleys and big 
round ships.81 The very first engagement between the two armadas proved him wrong. In the 
battle of Zonchio on July 24, 1499, great galleys proved to be one of the weakest links of the 
Venetian fleet. For four hours the opposing units exchanged gunfire, and it seemed, accord-
ing to the chief commander of great galleys that “if only all seventeen of them interfered, the 
victory would be a matter of minutes.”82 Instead, they took a very passive position. One of the 
great galleys sank a lighter Turkish vessel and then withdrew from the heart of the battle. 
Many others followed this example, breaking ranks and leaving lighter vessels unprotected 
against the Ottomans’ guns of. There was not much room for the interpretation of such behav-
ior. Disgusted by such disgrace and cowardice, the sailors shouted “Hang them, hang them!”83 
Bernardo Soligo, an experienced and brave warrior who happened to be on one of those great 
galleys, commented on the decision of the galley’s captain: “I would like to believe that it was 
cowardice, but I would rather call it rebellion.”84 To avoid uncomfortable meditation over the 
74 Sanuto, I Diarii, II, 502, 825, 862.
75 Ibid., II, 732.
76 Five members of the Collegio, elected by the Senate to six-month terms, who were responsible for maritime affairs. 
See Robert Finlay, Politics in Renaissance Venice (New Brunswick, N.J., 1980), xvi.
77 Malipiero, Annali Veneti, 166.
78 Bernard Doumerc, “De L’Incompetence a la Trahison: les Commndants de Galeres Venetiens Face aux Turcs (1499-
1500),” Felonie, Trahison, Reniements aux Moyen Age (Montpellier, 1997), 616.
79 Ibid.
80 Lane, Naval Actiones, 149.
81 Ibid, 150-151.
82 Sanuto II, 1237. 
83 For the account on the Battle of Zonchio see Sanuto, I Diarii, II, 1290-1294; Malipiero , Annali Veneti, 175-9; Girolamo 
Priuli, Diarii (Bologna, 1912-1938), I, 181-5.
84 Sanuto, I Diarii, II, 1258.
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very system of naval organization, the Venetians preferred to call the Zonchio fiasco “ treason.” 
Some patrons of the “cowardly galleys” were brought to the trial; others were interviewed by 
state officials. One of these patrons, expressing perhaps the secret thoughts of majority, re-
sponded to the accusations “it is one thing to be a merchant and an entirely different one to 
conduct the matters of state importance, or participate in the war.”85 
Zonchio was not the only disgraceful incident signaling the impotence of the great galleys’ 
naval organization. Several months later the patrons again refused to fight with the Turks at 
the besieged port of Modon, leading to the loss of the city.86 Naturally, not all of the patrons 
were inexperienced cowards. Rather they felt cheated by the state, and perhaps, both morally 
and technically unprepared for participation in naval operations. 
Despite their dual character, from the very beginning the great galleys were much more ac-
tively involved in trade then in naval operations. The precise conditions of the founding act 
slipped into oblivion, while the annual commercial voyages set the social-economic rhythm of 
the entire city for one hundred and seventy years. The merchants of Venice learned to perceive 
of the great galleys as one of their major financial assets. Thus the rapid and chaotic requisi-
tion of the ships in 1499 was interpreted as a violation of their rights. Without an efficient legal 
or administrative mechanism, the success of the transition to the military mode of operation 
depended heavily on the patrons’ financial motivation and patriotic ardor. The first was the 
case when the galleys were deployed in the guerre de course; the second was largely an il-
lusive matter of both ideological tradition and state propaganda. An unpopular doge and no 
anticipation of any financial gain significantly affected the great galleys’ mobilization and their 
way of naval conduct. 
The Turkish wars of 1499-1503 demanded almost constant participation from all the great gal-
leys. The merchants expressed growing mistrust of the government and reluctance to invest 
in operations, that were unlikely to bring any capital return. The Republic’s Levantine spice 
trade suffered more from this increasingly anachronistic system of organization than from the 
discovery of new spice routes by the Portuguese. It is not surprising, therefore, that almost 
immediately after the peace with Ottomans was signed the system of private operation of com-
munally owned galleys came to an end. When in 1514 the Venetian Senate abolished the com-
mercial monopolies of the state owned galleys and permitted private round ships to load spic-
es in Alexandria and Beirut, the great galleys were completely discarded as merchantmen.87 
The republic of Venice, on the other hand, continued building galleys, which now gained new 
importance as warships. According to the observation of Frederic Lane, “the same develop-
ment of artillery which rendered them less impregnable as carriers of precious merchandise 
also made it possible for them to become more formidable additions to the Mediterranean war 
fleets which were mainly composed of even more exposed light galleys.”88 
The organization of the Venetian fleet of great galleys in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries 
is an interesting example of an attempt to create a universal maritime unit, which was 
supposed to combine commercial and naval characteristics and represent both private and 
state segments of Venetian economy. Ambitious and demanding, this system in some way 
reflected more than mere development of administrative thought. It captured the ideal image 
of the powerful maritime state, in which all social and economic elements were harmoniously 
balanced, an image that clashed with reality.
85 Doumerc, “De l’incompetence”, 619.
86 Doumerc, “An Examplary Maritime Republic,” 165.
87 Lane, Venetian Ships, 29.
88 Ibid, 31.
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Pro Honore et Commercio Nostris
Jedan mletaËki rukopis iz kasnog 15. stoljeÊa kao prilog poznavanju 
mletaËke pomorske trgovine
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Rusija 
Rukopis Lat Q.v. II N12 koji se Ëuva u Nacionalnoj knjiænici u St. Petersburgu sastoji se 
od dva dokumenta. Prvi dokument su upute koje je mletaËki duæd Agostino Barbadigo dao 
Angelu Gradenigu, koji je 1492. imenovan zapovjednikom beirutske flote. Drugi dokument 
sadræi razmatranja mletaËkog Senata u vezi s prodajom Ëetiriju velikih galija i datiran je s 
18. svibnjem 1499. Beirut je uvijek imao poseban poloæaj u mletaËkoj trgovini, jer je bio vaæno 
trgovaËko srediπte zaËina i drugih unosnih roba koje su dolazile s istoka. U tom turbulentnom 
razdoblju povijesti republike Sv. Marka njezina levantska flota imala je kljuËnu vaænost, a 
Ëinile su je gotovo iskljuËivo velike galije. One su djelovale pod mjeπovitom upravom Republike 
i privatnika, a bile su veliki brodovi, dobrih plovnih sposobnosti i s iskusnim posadama. Zato 
su galije bile podjednako vaæne i za trgovinu i kao ratni brodovi. Rukopis daje podatke o 
organizaciji bejrutske flote, kako u razdobljima mirnodopske trgovine, tako i za vrijeme 
eskalacije sukoba s Turcima. »lanak uglavnom govori o odnosima republike Sv. Marka i 
privatnika u vezi s upravljanjem galijama, koje su bile vaæno pomorsko sredstvo. Osim toga, 
dani su i podaci o mletaËkom pomorskom pravu i povijesti Mediterana. 
KLJUËNE RIJEËI: MletaËka Republika, Venecija, Agostino Barbarigo, pomorstvo, kasni srednji 
vijek, rani novi vijek, Levant, izvorna graa
